Even by the standards of Pakistan's ever-volatile politics, the past ten weeks have been exceptionally turbulent in the country. Pakistan has had a new government since April 11 after Imran Khan was ousted by a vote of no confidence. The weeks leading up to the vote, from the filing of the motion on March 8 to the vote on April 10, were dramatic and full of intrigue. Now the country is in economic and political crisis. Shahbaz Sharif's new government is in a state of decision-making paralysis, struggling to find its footing as the ousted prime minister leads rallies across the country attacking the government's legitimacy and calling for fresh elections. At the same time, Pakistan is in the grip of an acute climate emergency. It's not just political temperatures that are rising: Pakistan has been engulfed in an unprecedented heat wave for weeks.
Fall of Khan's rule
Understanding how Khan's government fell is crucial to the current crisis. While Khan was the first Pakistani prime minister to be ousted by a vote of no confidence, he joined each of his predecessors as a prime minister who did not last five years – the length of a parliamentary term – in office. Pakistan's main opposition parties have called for Khan's ouster since taking office—calling him "chosen" by the military, not "elected"—and formed an alliance in the fall of 2020, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). for this purpose. This spring, the opposition prevailed. Externally, the opposition blamed governance and economic failures under Khan. But the main reason their maneuvers were successful was that Khan lost the support of the Pakistan Army, which helped him rise to power.
Several factors were responsible for the rift between Khan and the military, which had previously operated on the much-publicised 'same page'. The biggest was the impasse over the transfer of the director general of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in October 2021. Khan refused to sign off on the transfer of the director general, which had already been approved by the military, for several weeks. The ISI chief at the time was loyal to Khan and there was speculation that Khan wanted him to be in the next election (or perhaps even to appoint him as the next army chief).
Once Khan lost the support of the army - although the army said it had become neutral - the opposition was given room to make its moves. Two small parties associated with Khan in the ruling coalition defected to the opposition, depriving him of his slim majority in the National Assembly.
Khan has concocted a conspiracy theory to blame for his government's collapse - claiming, without evidence, that the US is pursuing "regime change" following an "independent foreign policy" and claiming that "local perpetrators" are responsible - claims that Pakistan's National Security Committee has rejected. But Khan and his allies have also hinted that the military is responsible for his departure - sometimes in veiled language and sometimes pointingfingers more directly at "neutrals" as they now refer to the military. In doing so, they are testing the limits of political confrontation with the military and backing down only when they push back on their demands.
Intense polarization
Khan used his sacking to galvanize his supporters. Day after day at huge rallies across the country he calls the new government an "imported government" and the new prime minister a "crime minister". Khan has used his rallies and interviews to garner media attention and claims that the fall of his government has returned to power the corrupt politicians who are responsible for Pakistan's problems. His supporters, many of them middle-class, young and urban, and furious at what they see as Khan's unceremonious, orchestrated ouster, are echoing his words on social media. Through this narrative of grievance, Khan seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the new government; his party has resigned from parliament and is calling for new elections. He now plans to lead a "freedom march" to Islamabad, possibly later this month, to further pressure the government over the elections.
In contrast, supporters of the parties that form the government see Khan's exit as democratic and view his policies as dangerous. Pakistan today has echoes of the post-January 6 period in the United States, a polarization so deep that each faction sees no validity in the other's arguments. Khan's supporters in particular do not trust anything the new government or the military says. In recent weeks, politicians from both parties have also resorted to using religion to attack the other side, which is dangerous in a country where weaponizing religion can be a death sentence.
New government
The new government, led by PML-N's Shahbaz Sharif, faces formidable challenges – and not just from Khan. Shahbaz's brother, three-time former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who was ousted in 2017 on corruption charges and now lives in London, still exercises excessive control over the party and indeed the government. Shahbaz, a three-time former chief minister of Pakistan's largest province Punjab, has played second fiddle to the more charismatic Nawaz throughout his political career. Last week, the prime minister and key members of his cabinet made a surprise trip to London to consult with Nawaz on the direction of the new government. While they were overseas, Pakistan's economy continued its downward spiral. The rupee continued its steep slide against the dollar; the stock market also lost value.
The government faces a key decision on whether to continue costly, unsustainable fuel subsidies imposed by Khan's government, which the International Monetary Fund wants removed as a condition for resuming Pakistan's credit program. Removing the subsidies would certainly be unpopular, which worries the time-limited government ahead of the next election. So far, the government has stalled and announced earlier this week, against the advice of its own finance minister, that it would maintain subsidies
Shahbaz's overall hesitance probably reflects deference to Nawaz and his team, who may have differing views, and the fact that he commands an unwieldy coalition of rival parties that will contest the next election. However, part of the indecision has to do with the fact that the PDM's main objective was to unseat Khan; they didn't really come up with an alternative governance plan or economic strategy before coming to power. This lack of plan is now showing in the face of Pakistan's economic crisis.
New Election
A major issue contributing to Pakistan's political uncertainty is the timing of the next election, which must be held by the summer of 2023. Khan has made it clear that he wants to use his current momentum for immediate elections. In the days leading up to his downfall, he sought to deprive the then-opposition of a runway in government by unconstitutionally dissolving parliament, a decision that was (rightly) overturned by Pakistan's Supreme Court. In turn, the new government can use its time in power to turn things around in its favor, including by addressing outstanding corruption cases.
The question is whether Nawaz can or will return to Pakistan before the next elections. If he does, it could strengthen the PML-N base, but if he does not face prosecution upon his return, it will strengthen Khan's argument that the Sharifs politically manipulated the corruption cases against them. The PML-N also faces significant obstacles, including an economic crisis that is partly shaped by exogenous factors, a power struggle in Punjab, and a president who belongs to and is loyal to Khan's party. The coalition government this week said it would not go to an early election; Former President Asif Ali Zardari insisted that the election not be held before parliament could implement electoral reform.
Whenever the next election is held, it is far from clear what the outcome will be. In Pakistan's parliamentary system, what matters is which party can win over the most "electables" - powerful politicians in local constituencies. Big city rallies may confirm Khan's personal popularity, but they don't necessarily define how his party fares in parliamentary elections. Another factor that has historically determined which party elected politicians join is where the support of a powerful military leans.
Bottom Line
This brings us to the final result. The fundamentals of the system in Pakistan, under the intense ongoing political wrangling, remain the same. Whether you have the support of the Pakistan Army is important for political success. Political parties now directly point to military interference in politics, but only when they are in opposition; when they are in government and enjoy this support, they do little to challenge it. This was true for Khan's party when it was in power and it is true for Sharif's government now.
The growing political tension in Pakistan ultimately means an opportunistic power struggle. It left the country a political wreck. And in all of this, there is little regard on either side for the continued suffering of ordinary Pakistanis, who continue to pay the price for the country's long history of political instability.
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