"Fog and friction" in war, as Clausewitz put it, can make even the most basic actions difficult. Similarly, the battle is full of truths, myths, and blunders. One aspect of the Ukraine conflict is particularly alarming. That is the stark contrast between Western and Russian perspectives on the conflict, how it is being fought, and who is to blame.
Myths muddle reality and distort it. Three illusions about Ukraine are worth debunking. The first is NATO's Article 5's ironclad guarantee of its sanctity. The second is the fallacy that Ukraine's sovereignty was guaranteed by the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, which was contingent on Kyiv giving up its nuclear weapons. Last, but not least, there was the legend of Russian military might.
Finally, many conflicts are lost due to errors. Russia, according to Napoleon and Hitler, might be defeated. Japan bet that by sinking America's battleships at Pearl Harbor, an isolated United States would be forced to sue for peace. And Saddam Hussein took a chance, betting that the fear of non-existent WMD would dissuade the US from invading Iraq. The United States has made its fair share of mistakes.
The threat of a real clash is evident. Russians, and possibly Belarusians, are unable to comprehend the depth of the carnage inflicted on Ukrainian civilians by this barbaric conflict. Russians are instead informed by state-controlled news and propaganda, which claims that Western reporting is false. This hinders any departure strategy Vladimir Putin might adopt short of an unattainable full victory. Putin must bridge this perceptual chasm between what his audience has been told and the Russian concessions required to end this war, which is in direct opposition to his propaganda.
Article 5 is not an automatic declaration of war, contrary to popular belief. Take note of the following sections of Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America will be considered an attack against all of them (shall take) whatever action it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, individually and in concert with the other Parties. Automaticity cannot be guaranteed because thirty members must agree.
The Budapest Agreement guarantees Ukraine's integrity as long as it remains a non-nuclear armed state. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation seized custody of all nuclear weapons, including those held by former states. The Russian military's Strategic Rocket Force continued to operate such systems until they were returned to Russia. Ukraine was unable to relinquish control of a nuclear arsenal it had never acquired.
Russian military prowess was maybe the biggest fallacy. The terrible performance of the Russian military in Ukraine was particularly shocking. Putin was praised for overhauling the Russian military alongside Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of Defense Valerie Gerasimov. While Russia's military shortcomings were exposed during the brief war with Georgia in 2008, it's backing for Syria in 2015 was considered as skillful use of force. The annual May Day parades included equipment that appeared to be technically advanced but performed poorly in combat. If true, reports of Russian requests for both economic and military aid from China, particularly drones, bolster the fiction of Russian military superiority.
When it comes to blunders, the Russian invasion of Ukraine stands out as both a tactical and humanitarian tragedy. In the long run, no matter how or when this war ends, Ukraine and Russia will have suffered irreversible damage. It's impossible to say whether or not Putin will remain in power for a long time.
A key error has been the United States' hostile approach toward China at a time when its collaboration is required. Since the 2011 "pivot" to Asia, US-China relations have been tense, aggravated by trade penalties and the designation of China as the "pacing threat" for national security planning. Last year's "Baked Alaska" conference between China and the United States was combative, reflecting one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement in Congress on China's danger.
On Monday, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Yang Jiechi, China's foreign policy chief, in Rome to discuss Ukraine. That meeting was a disaster. Sullivan warned China about the ramifications of assisting Moscow. Yang resisted. In addition, allegations of Moscow's plea for aid were refuted by both China and Russia. This encounter is unlikely to improve the odds of diplomacy ending the bloodshed in Ukraine.
Diplomacy necessitates inventive, collaborative, and astute statesmanship, which appears to be absent in US talks. However, the Ukrainian issue may be so severe that no policy, no matter how creative, will be able to influence the outcome. If that is right, the future seems dismal, exacerbated by these realities, misconceptions, and errors. Finally, many conflicts are lost due to errors. Russia, according to Napoleon and Hitler, might be defeated. Japan bet that by sinking America's battleships at Pearl Harbor, an isolated United States would be forced to sue for peace. And Saddam Hussein took a chance, betting that the fear of non-existent WMD would dissuade the US from invading Iraq. The United States has made its fair share of mistakes.
The threat of a real clash is evident. Russians, and possibly Belarusians, are unable to comprehend the depth of the carnage inflicted on Ukrainian civilians by this barbaric conflict. Russians are instead informed by state-controlled news and propaganda, which claims that Western reporting is false. This hinders any departure strategy Vladimir Putin might adopt short of an unattainable full victory. Putin must bridge this perceptual chasm between what his audience has been told and the Russian concessions required to end this war, which is in direct opposition to his propaganda.
Article 5 is not an automatic declaration of war, contrary to popular belief. Take note of the following sections of Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America will be considered an attack against all of them.... (shall take) whatever action it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, individually and in concert with the other Parties... Automaticity cannot be guaranteed because thirty members must agree.
The Budapest Agreement guarantees Ukraine's integrity as long as it remains a non-nuclear armed state. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation seized custody of all nuclear weapons, including those held by former states. The Russian military's Strategic Rocket Force continued to operate such systems until they were returned to Russia. Ukraine was unable to relinquish control of a nuclear arsenal it had never acquired.
Russian military prowess was maybe the biggest fallacy. The terrible performance of the Russian military in Ukraine was particularly shocking. Putin was praised for overhauling the Russian military alongside Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of Defense Valerie Gerasimov. While Russia's military shortcomings were exposed during the brief war with Georgia in 2008, its backing for Syria in 2015 was considered a skillful use of force. The annual May Day parades included equipment that appeared to be technically advanced but performed poorly in combat. If true, reports of Russian requests for both economic and military aid from China, particularly drones, bolster the fiction of Russian military superiority.
When it comes to blunders, the Russian invasion of Ukraine stands out as both a tactical and humanitarian tragedy. In the long run, no matter how or when this war ends, Ukraine and Russia will have suffered irreversible damage. It's impossible to say whether or not Putin will remain in power for a long time.
A key error has been the United States' hostile approach toward China at a time when its collaboration is required. Since the 2011 "pivot" to Asia, US-China relations have been tense, aggravated by trade penalties and the designation of China as the "pacing threat" for national security planning. Last year's "Baked Alaska" conference between China and the United States was combative, reflecting one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement in Congress on China's danger.
On Monday, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Yang Jiechi, China's foreign policy chief, in Rome to discuss Ukraine. That meeting was a disaster. Sullivan warned China about the ramifications of assisting Moscow. Yang resisted. In addition, allegations of Moscow's plea for aid were refuted by both China and Russia. This encounter is unlikely to improve the odds of diplomacy ending the bloodshed in Ukraine.
Diplomacy necessitates inventive, collaborative, and astute statesmanship, which appears to be absent in US talks. However, the Ukrainian issue may be so severe that no policy, no matter how creative, will be able to influence the outcome. If that is right, the future seems dismal, exacerbated by these realities, misconceptions, and errors.
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