How Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine?

For several weeks, even as they raised the buzzer about Russia’s unprecedented military build-up on Ukraine’s border, Western leaders and administrators had expressed their view that Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, had not yet made an ultimate decision. There was still duration, they said, for Mr Putin to step back from the brink. On February 18th the mood changed. Joe Biden, America’s president, told that he was “convinced”, based on intelligence, that Mr Putin’s sense was now made up. Russia would attack Ukraine “in the imminent days”—and it would target Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

 

The crisis on Ukraine’s border has cooked since October, when American officials first glanced at unusual military movements that prompted them to warn, the next month, of an onslaught. For weeks, America and its European allies have warned that Russia would seek to produce a pretext for war, such as a “false flag” assault that would be criticized on Ukraine. In recent days, an indication that such pretexts are being designed has been coming thick and fast.

 

On February 15th Mr Putin claimed, without the tiniest evidence, that Ukraine’s government was committing “genocide” in the region of south-eastern Ukraine where Russia has equipped and backed proxy militias, and their self-declared “republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk. On February 18th those states began evacuating citizens to Russia, as the Kremlin claimed, again without proof, that Ukraine was preparing to invade the Eastern Ukraine. That evening, Russia’s state-run media published photos and videos of an explosion outside a government facility in Donetsk and the sabotage of a gas pipeline near Luhansk. A day after, both the Donetsk and Luhansk republics declared openly a general movenent for war. In Luhansk, men aged 18 to 55 were told they would not be enabled to leave. Russian outlets alleged that a Ukrainian shell had landed inside Russia itself.

 

This seemingly spontaneous spiral was as vastly as a crisis. The idea that Ukraine’s army, having observed outstanding restraint for months, would launch an assault while encircled by as many as 190,000 hostile troops is fanciful. Researchers studying the videos in which the Donetsk and Luhansk leaders announced their evacuations found that the statements had been recorded on February 16th, two days early, and before the escalation in shelling had started.

 

On February 14th Russia’s defence minister said Mr Putin that the nation’s “exercises”—the Kremlin’s period for the build-up—were “coming to an end” and that battalions would be withdrawn to barracks. Instead, in the days that followed, more troops arrived. Russia now has over 110  battalion tactical groups (BTGs), fighting formations of 1,000 or so combatants equipped with artillery, air defence and logistics were deployed on the border, according to American and British defence officials.

 

New satellite imagery circulated on February 18th shows large amounts of newly-arrived helicopters in Belarus, a Russian airfield 16km from the Ukrainian border. Armoured vehicles that belong to Russia’s airborne forces, and outfitted with parachutes, have been sighted in several parts of the country. There is also evidence that Russian forces are suppressing their movements. “In recent days I have seen a lot of pictures which show Russian armies in their camps covering in forests, in Belarus.

 

Though Russia has constantly denied that it plans to attack Ukraine, Western security officials say that they have had insight into Mr Putin’s war agendas for months and that the Kremlin aims to establish a pro-Russian dictatorship in Kyiv with Russian control down to the Ukrainian level, backed with an occupation force if essential.

 

Russian battalions in western Russia and Crimea are expected to mount a “double encirclement”, or pincer activity, against Ukrainian troops around Donbas, where the majority of Ukraine's most intricate and combat-ready armies are based, breaking them and cutting them off from the west of the country—including by invading or demolishing bridges over the Dnieper. The major thrust, officials assert, will probably be directed at Kyiv, by Russian troops in Belarus, accompanied by excessive use of electronic warfare and air and missile attacks on military targets and crucial infrastructure. On February 17th Britain’s defence ministry published a map portraying Russia’s “possible axis of invasion” consistent with these recommendations.

 

Many Russian critics express doubts about such impressive plans. “I don't speculate in a large-scale military march on Ukraine,” a think-tank in Moscow. “With such a parade and any occupation of territory, it is not apparent what we will get out of it except more problems.” Ukraine’s armed forces have enhanced significantly since 2014, confidence on the front line is high and they would battle. But they are trailing behind in air defences and are ill-prepared for the sort of sweeping combined-arms offensives and airmobile invasions that Russia can mount. They are likely to fare badly in the first stages of the war.

 

However, it is far from obvious that the Kremlin has a sober awareness of the degree of opposition it would then face. Less than ten per cent of Ukrainians supported pro-Russian parties in the previous elections. Kyiv has also been readying for an invasion for eight years, with the key infrastructure of a guerrilla campaign is already in place. How prosperous it could depend on many aspects, including the region in issue. Just as significant is the degree of support extended by friendly nations, such as America, Poland and Britain. “There are remarkably rare historical cases of resistances that, by themselves, overthrow the more powerful occupier,” notes Brian Petit, a former American special forces colonel, in an article for War on the Rocks, a website. “As a rule, it takes external backing to tilt the scales in favour of the resistance”.

 

Such outside support may be aimed at simply miring Russia in a protracted and bloody occupation. Biden administration officials have told, privately, that the Pentagon and CIA would furnish arms and other help to any Ukrainian rebellion, much as they supported the anti-Soviet mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Poland and the Baltic states would also perhaps offer support. So, too, Romania would, says Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank, who reports that the nation shares the longest and most mountainous border with Ukraine of any European nation. “The key for Romania is Moldova”, he says. “If Ukraine tumbles to the Russians, Moldova is next”.

 

Military uncertainties rose further as Russia began a large scale strategic nuclear training on February 19th, that involved ballistic and cruise missile launches to test the willingness of Russia’s sea, air and land-based nuclear troops.

 

Even so, most see a storm arriving. Though Antony Blinken, Mr Biden’s secretary of state, intends to meet Russia’s foreign minister, in the coming days, America’s examination that Mr Putin has already agreed on war, and Russia's foreign minister marginal role in the Kremlin’s decision-making, offer slight encouragement. “For the first time in decades, we, regrettably, find ourselves on the brink of a war which can draw entire Europe into it,” warned Belarus President, as he sat next to Mr Putin on February 18th. The United States and its European allies are finding themselves in grim agreement.

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